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SECOND CHANCES: WHY MICHIGAN SHOULD CATEGORICALLY
PROHIBIT THE SENTENCE OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
Richard Zhao*

ABSTRACT
The United States is the only country in the world that sentences children to die in
prison. This practice, known as juvenile life without parole (JLWOP), is condemned by
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet twenty-five states still
permit the sentence, and Michigan houses one of the nation’s largest JLWOP
populations. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ban on some forms of JLWOP, more
must be done to further limit the use of this sentence. The current JLWOP sentencing
scheme is untenable, imposes a significant financial burden on taxpayers, and
perpetuates racial inequality. This Note explores these reasons for eliminating the
practice and ultimately urges Michigan to follow other states in enacting a categorical
ban on JLWOP, either through judicial decision or legislative action.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2020, Michigan settled Hill v. Whitmer, a decade-long
class action brought by the ACLU of Michigan on behalf of 350 individuals serving life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences for crimes committed
when they were minors. 1 The action started as a challenge to Michigan’s
mandatory juvenile LWOP (JLWOP) scheme, 2 which required an LWOP
sentence for individuals who committed certain crimes prior to age
eighteen. 3 The original class action complaint alleged, among other
things, that a mandatory JLWOP scheme violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for failing to take into
account salient youthful characteristics, including transient immaturi-

1. State Settles Decade-Long Lawsuit Challenging Unconstitutional Punishment of Children with Life
Behind Bars Without the Possibility of Parole, AM. C.L. UNION (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.aclu.org
/press-releases/state-settles-decade-long-lawsuit-challenging-unconstitutional-punishment-children
[https://perma.cc/85F2-85EV].
2. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunction Relief ¶ 10, Hill v. Snyder, No. 10cv-14568, 2013 WL 364198 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013), vacated and remanded, 821 F.3d 763 (6th Cir.
2016).
3. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(6)(1953) (listing six types of offense as disqualifying for
parole eligibility, including first-degree murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct).
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ty, a lack of sense of responsibility, and possibility of rehabilitation. 4
While the case was pending in the district court, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, finding that a mandatory
JLWOP sentence, such as the one at issue in Hill, violated the Eighth
Amendment. 5 Following this decision, the Hill Court granted partial
judgment to the plaintiffs in 2013, finding that the Michigan statute
under challenge imposed a cruel and unusual punishment. 6
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller applied retroactively, thereby requiring states to provide resentencing hearings for juvenile lifers sentenced prior to the Miller decision. 7 Despite Miller and Montgomery, however, the Hill plaintiffs
continued to be treated as if they were serving a non-parolable life sentence. 8 Seeking further redress, these plaintiffs subsequently filed two
amended complaints, alleging, among other things, that 1) they were
deprived of programming essential to demonstrate their rehabilitation
progress; and 2) the Michigan Attorney General failed to exercise her
authority over prosecutors who were responsible for delays in resentencing. 9 The Hill settlement tackled these two issues by providing that
the State of Michigan would ensure prompt scheduling of resentencing
hearings as well as adequate access to rehabilitative programming for
the class plaintiffs. 10
Although the Hill plaintiffs received their settlement, the circumstances of the case highlight two problems that make further reform
necessary. First, there is significant delay in resentencing. A Detroit
Free Press story in 2019 revealed that fifty-five percent of the those sentenced to JLWOP in Michigan had yet to get their second chance. 11 Second, JLWOP is often re-imposed at resentencing. Of the incarcerated
individuals who did get a resentencing recommendation, sixty-six percent remained on JLWOP, 12 a percentage seemingly inconsistent with
the Miller Court’s admonition that JLWOP be imposed only in the rarest
of cases. 13 This resentencing problem is especially acute in Michigan,
4. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunction Relief, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
5. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
6. Hill, 2013 WL 364198, at *2.
7. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2015) (“Miller announced a substantive rule
that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”).
8. Third Amended Complaint ¶ 7, Hill v. Whitmer, 10-cv-14568, 2020 WL 2849969 (E.D.
Mich. June 2, 2020), ECF No. 298.
9. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 274.
10. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, to
Direct Class Notice, and to Schedule a Fairness Hearing at 3, 4, Hill, 2020 WL 2849969,ECF No.
342.
11. Allie Gross, More Than Half of Michigan Juvenile Lifers Still Wait for Resentencing, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Aug. 16, 2019, 10:51 PM), freep.com/in-depth/news/local/michigan/2019/08/15/juvenilelifers-michigan/1370127001/ [https://perma.cc/2Y2W-2LAK].
12. Id.
13. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
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where JLWOP is imposed not only on principal defendants who committed certain felonies but also on individuals convicted under an aiding-and-abetting theory and those who committed felony-murder. 14
This scheme represents a further departure from the idea that JLWOP
should be for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”15 Therefore, the Hill settlement, while a victory for the
class plaintiffs, is not sufficient to bring Michigan into full compliance
with the teaching of Miller. Further reform is necessary.
This Note advocates for a categorical ban of JLWOP in Michigan.
Part I provides an overview of JLWOP jurisprudence. Part II urges the
Michigan Supreme Court to categorically prohibit the sentence. Part III
discusses potential paths of reform other than a judicial determination
of the sentence’s unconstitutionality.
I. OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE JURISPRUDENCE
This Part discusses six cases. Section I.A discusses three foundational U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment cases, known as the Miller trilogy. Section I.B discusses Montgomery v. Louisiana, a 2016 U.S.
Supreme Court case holding that Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively.
Section I.C introduces People v. Carp, the seminal JLWOP case in Michigan. Finally, Part I.D considers People v. Skinner, a Michigan Supreme
Court case, and Jones v. Mississippi, a United States Supreme Court case.
These two cases concerned when JLWOP may be imposed. Ultimately,
these cases demonstrate that sentencing children to die in prison is
both conceptually and practically untenable. A categorical ban on the
sentence is the only path forward.
A. Unconstitutionality of Mandatory JLWOP: The Miller Trilogy
1. Roper and Graham
The first two cases of the Miller trilogy, Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, laid the groundwork for Miller’s holding that mandatory
JLWOP is unconstitutional. Roper and Graham both considered whether
the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of a particular sentence
on juveniles. Roper challenged the juvenile death penalty, 16 whereas Graham dealt with the imposition of JLWOP on offenders who committed

14.
15.
16.

Kimberly Thomas, Juvenile Life Without Parole, 90 MICH. B.J. 34, 34 (2011).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005).
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non-homicide offenses before the age of eighteen. 17 In both cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court applied a two-step categorical approach and found
an Eighth Amendment violation.
First, the Court examined whether the “evolving standards of decency” demonstrated a national consensus against the imposition of the
challenged sentence. 18 In Roper, the Court opined that “the rejection of
the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; [and] the infrequency of its use even where it remain[ed] on the books,” constituted sufficient evidence of a national consensus against the sentence. 19 In a similar vein, the Graham Court found that, while the majority of states
permitted JLWOP for non-homicide offenders, when it came to actual
sentencing practices, JLWOP was infrequently invoked. The Court observed that “nationwide there are only 109 juvenile offenders serving
sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.” 20 In light of
the rarity of the sentence, the Court found a national consensus against
the imposition of JLWOP on non-homicide juvenile offenders. 21
Second, in both cases, the Court determined whether the challenged sentence was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles. 22 The
Court considered three factors: the culpability of the offender, the severity of the punishment, and fulfillment of penological goals. 23 In both
Roper and Graham, the Court found the sentences disproportionate, relying heavily on three constitutionally significant differences between
juvenile and adult offenders. First, juveniles lack maturity and a sense
of responsibility. 24 Second, “juveniles are more susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” 25 Finally,
the qualities that juveniles possess are transitory. 26 Based on these observations, the Court concluded that 1) juveniles were less morally culpable than adults committing the same offense; 27 2) the two challenged
sentences were especially harsh for juvenile offenders; 28 and 3) neither
deterrence, retribution, nor rehabilitation justified the sentence at issue. 29
Roper and Graham clarified the Court’s juvenile Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on two fronts. Conceptually, the Court stressed that ju17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 561–67; Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 61; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 68–69; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Id. at 570.
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.
See id. at 70.
Id. at 71–74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72.
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veniles were different from adults under the U.S. Constitution and
therefore deserved special consideration during sentencing.
The Court also clarified the test for deciding similar cases in the future. 30 Importantly, the Graham Court specifically rejected a threepronged proportionality test that prior courts had applied in cases involving “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all
the circumstances in a particular case.” 31 The majority explained that
the case “implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.” 32 As
such, the two-step categorical approach to juvenile sentencing cases,
which is capable of considering characteristics of individual offenders,
is more appropriate.
2. Miller v. Alabama
Two years after Graham, the Court heard Miller v. Alabama. 33 Miller
involved a sentencing scheme where individuals committing certain
crimes received a mandatory JLWOP sentence. 34 Justice Kagan, writing
for a five-member majority, found that such a mandatory scheme was
cruel and unusual to minors under the Eighth Amendment.
First, the Court reaffirmed the observations made in Roper and
Graham that children were constitutionally different than adults in
terms of their maturity, sense of responsibility, and vulnerability to the
surrounding environment. 35 These attributes of youth, the Court
opined, “diminish the penological justifications for imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit
terrible crimes.” 36 Second, the Court built on Graham’s analogy of
JLWOP to the death penalty and held that the mandated individualized
assessments in capital punishment cases should be available in JLWOP
cases as well. Because a mandatory JLWOP sentence precluded
individualized assessments of youthful characteristics, the sentence
necessarily violated Graham’s fundamental teaching that “youth matters

30. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62.
31. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. The three-pronged test consists of 1) a judgment of whether the
gravity of the offense is commensurate with the severity of the sentence; 2) a comparison between
the challenged sentence and sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for crimes deemed more
serious; and 3) a comparison between the challenged sentence and the sentence imposed in other
jurisdictions for the same crime. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296–300 (1983).
32. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
33. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
34. Id. at 468–69.
35. Id. at 471.
36. Id. at 472.
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in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration
without the possibility of parole.” 37
Miller articulated five mitigating factors that must be considered
when sentencing a juvenile offender. 38 The decision did not, however,
give clear instructions for assessing these factors. As a result, Miller
preserved JLWOP as a form of punishment for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” 39 but it failed to
explain whether and how sentencing authorities should determine that
a juvenile offender was incorrigible. That question was answered in
Jones v. Mississippi, as discussed in Section I.D.
B. Retroactive Application of Miller: Montgomery v. Louisiana
Unlike the Miller trilogy, Montgomery v. Louisiana did not challenge a
particular sentence; it was a case about the retroactive application of
Miller. 40 After Miller, state courts split over whether Miller should be applied to sentences that had been finalized before Miller was decided. A
split emerged. Several states, including Michigan, found that Miller
should not be applied retroactively because the decision amounted to
only a new procedural rule. 41 A larger number of states concluded that
Miller should be applied retroactively because it effected a substantive
change in the law. 42 The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the
split. 43
In a 6-3 decision, the Montgomery Court held that Miller announced
a new substantive rule. 44 By invalidating mandatory JLWOP as unconstitutional, the Miller Court categorically prohibited JLWOP except in
the rare cases in which the juvenile offender exhibited irreparable cor-

37. Id. at 473.
38. These five factors are: 1) the offender’s immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences; 2) family and home environment; 3) circumstances of the offense, including the extent of the offender’s participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the offender; 4) the possibility of being convicted of a lesser crime if not for
an incompetency associated with youth; and 5) possibility of rehabilitation. See id. at 477–78.
39. Id. at 479–80 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
40. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 193 (2016).
41. See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for Juveniles Is the Only
Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 162 (2017). The Michigan Supreme Court confronted this issue in People v. Carp, infra Section I.C, and concluded that Miller did not meet either the
federal or state retroactivity test. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014), vacated sub nom.
Carp v. Michigan, 577 U.S. 1186 (2016), and vacated sub nom. Davis v. Michigan, 577 U.S. 1186 (2016).
42. See Reichman Hoesterey, supra note 41, at 152 n.7.
43. State v. Montgomery, 194 So.3d 606 (La. 2016), cert. granted, 575 U.S. 911 (2015).
44. Montgomery, 577 U.S at 206 (“Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”).
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ruption. 45 Thus, the Montgomery Court held, Miller applied retroactively
under the federal retroactivity test. 46
C. Constitutionality of JLWOP in Michigan: People v. Carp
The seminal JLWOP case in Michigan is the Michigan Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision in People v. Carp, a case that dealt with the constitutionality of JLWOP under the federal and state constitutions. 47 First,
the court assessed JLWOP under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 48 There, the court adopted the three-pronged proportionality test that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in Graham. 49 Applying
the first prong, whether “the gravity of the offense is commensurate
with the severity of the sentence,” 50 the court concluded that the imposition of JLWOP for first-degree murder will not “lead[] to an inference
of gross disproportionality” in cases where the juvenile offender was determined to possess the same moral culpability and mental faculties as
adults. 51
The second prong compares JLWOP with the sentences received by
other offenders in the same jurisdiction. 52 The court noted that adults
committing certain nonhomicide offenses would face an LWOP sentence in Michigan. 53 Therefore, “when the commission of a nonhomicide offense by an adult offender may result in the imposition of a lifewithout-parole sentence, it does not appear categorically disproportionate to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender
for committing the gravest and most serious homicide offense.” 54 Further, in what appeared to be a separation of powers argument, the court
observed that “the people of this state, acting through their Legislature,
have already exercised their judgment—to which we owe considerable
deference—that the sanction they have selected for juvenile first-degree
murder offenders is, in fact, a proportionate sanction.” 55
45. See id. at 734.
46. See id. at 736. The federal retroactivity test was announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). In Teague, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure
should not apply retroactively, with two exceptions. First, new substantive rules of criminal law
should apply retroactively. Second, a “watershed” rule implicating fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings should apply retroactively. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
47. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801.
48. Id. at 841.
49. Id. at 842.
50. Id. at 842 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, at 60 (2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 60) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 842–43 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 60).
53. Id. at 843.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Under the third prong, the court compared JLWOP for first-degree
murder “with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 56 The court noted that at the time of Miller, “41 states exercised the authority under at least some circumstances to impose a lifewithout-parole sentence on a juvenile.” 57 Only six states had since
abandoned JLWOP in response to Miller. 58 The court concluded that because thirty-five states still permitted JLWOP after Miller, this sentence
was not disproportionate in at least some circumstances. 59 Thus, the
court concluded that defendants’ claim failed under all three prongs of
the federal test. 60
Regarding defendants’ state constitutional argument, the court
first recognized that the “cruel or unusual” language of the Michigan
Constitution provided “greater protection against certain punishments
than its federal counterpart.” 61 As a result, Michigan employed a “slightly different and broader test for proportionality than that employed in
Graham.” 62 The test consisted of four parts:
1) the severity of the sentence imposed compared to the gravity
of the offense; 2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared
to penalties imposed on other offenders in the same jurisdiction; 3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other
states; and 4) whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation. 63
The court observed that the first three parts of the Michigan test largely
resembled the federal test. 64 As defendants failed to satisfy any prong
under the federal test, so they also failed the first three parts of the
Michigan test. 65
The only remaining inquiry was whether JLWOP advanced the goal
of rehabilitation. The Carp majority answered in the negative, citing
Graham’s observation that “[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” 66 Nonetheless, since only one of the four factors sup-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 842–43 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 60).
Id. at 843.
Id.
See id. at 843–44.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010)).
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ported a finding of disproportionality, defendants’ state constitutionality challenge failed as well. 67
D. Incorrigibility Is Not Mandated: Skinner and Jones
As discussed above, Miller reserved JLWOP for the rare juvenile offenders whose crimes reflected true incorrigibility. After Miller, state
and federal appellate courts were divided on the question of whether a
sentencer must make a factual finding of incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP sentence. 68 The Michigan Supreme Court, in the 2018 decision People v. Skinner, answered that question in the negative. 69
Roughly three years later, resolving the split, the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed with that outcome in Jones v. Mississippi. 70
1. People v. Skinner
Skinner considered whether Miller and Montgomery mandated a
finding of incorrigibility in the Sixth Amendment context. Specifically,
the Michigan Supreme Court examined whether Michigan’s JLWOP
sentencing regime, MCL § 769.25, violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge, rather than a jury, to decide whether to impose a
JLWOP sentence. 71 The majority held that it did not. 72
Still in force today, MCL § 769.25 requires prosecutors and the trial
court to engage in additional steps before imposing JLWOP. 73 First, to
seek a JLWOP sentence, a prosecutor must file a motion within a specified timeframe. 74 Upon receiving the motion, the trial court must hold a
67. Id. at 845–46.
68. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 435 (Pa. 2017) (holding that a sentencing court’s imposition of a discretionary JLWOP sentence without first making a finding of a
juvenile defendant’s permanent incorrigibility was illegal), abrogated by Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.
Ct. 1307 (2021), Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a sentencing
judge violated Miller’s rule any time it imposed a JLWOP sentence without first making an explicit
finding of permanent incorrigibility), abrogated by Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307, and Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d
403, 412 (Ga. 2016) (holding that a trial court’s failure to find a distinct determination of a juvenile
defendant’s irreparable corruption required remand), abrogated by Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307, with, e.g.,
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 665 (Wash. 2017) (holding that Montgomery explicitly found that Miller
did not require a finding of incorrigibility), People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 309 (Mich. 2018)
(holding that Miller did not require a finding regarding a child’s incorrigibility), and United States
v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748, 756 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Miller did not mandate a finding of a juvenile defendant’s permanent incorrigibility).
69. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 317.
70. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1321.
71. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 295.
72. Id. at 137–38.
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2022).
74. Id. § 769.25(3).
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hearing to consider the Miller factors 75 and then “specify on the record
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances considered by the court
and the court’s reasons supporting the sentence imposed.” 76 Absent a
prosecutorial motion seeking JLWOP, the trial court must impose a default term-of-years sentence. 77
The Skinner defendants challenged the statute as violating the Sixth
Amendment. 78 They argued that the last step in this sentencing procedure—allowing a trial judge to engage in additional fact-finding to
support a JLWOP sentence—was impermissible because the Sixth
Amendment mandated that a jury, rather than a judge, find beyond a
reasonable doubt any facts that would increase the sentence beyond the
one authorized by the jury verdict alone. 79
The majority, led by former Chief Justice Markman, found no such
violation. The court held that neither the challenged statute, nor Miller
and Montgomery, required a trial court to conduct additional factfinding regarding a juvenile’s incorrigibility before imposing a JLWOP
sentence. 80 First, the majority posited that the challenged statute did
not require the trial court to make any particular factual finding before
it may impose JLWOP. 81 Although the statute required the trial court to
consider and specify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
supporting its sentencing decision, the trial court did not have to find
an aggravating circumstance in order to impose JLWOP. 82 In other
words, the jury verdict alone authorized a JLWOP sentence. 83 Second,
the majority held that neither Miller nor Montgomery mandated any particular finding regarding a juvenile offender’s incorrigibility. 84 Rather,
the Miller and Montgomery courts used words like “rare” and “exceptional” merely to describe their prediction that incorrigible juvenile offenders deserving of JLWOP would be rare. 85 For these reasons, the Skinner

75. Id. § 769.25(6).
76. Id. § 769.25(7).
77. Id. § 769.25(4).
78. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 295.
79. Defendants’ challenge was based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Apprendi line of cases. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires an aggravating circumstance necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty to be found by a jury).
80. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 307, 310.
81. Id. at 307.
82. Id. at 306.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 309.
85. Id. at 313–14. In other words, Miller and Montgomery simply noted that those juvenile offenders who are deserving of life-without-parole sentences are rare; they did not impose any requirement on sentencing courts to explicitly find that a juvenile offender is or is not “rare” before
imposing life without parole. Id.

702

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:3

court held the trial court did not have to find any facts beyond those inherent in the jury verdict to impose JLWOP, and as a result, the sentencing statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment. 86
2. Jones v. Mississippi
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Mississippi to resolve
the split over whether the Eighth Amendment required a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile offender was permanently incorrigible before sentencing them to JLWOP. 87 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
sided with the Skinner majority and held that a JLWOP sentence did not
require a finding of incorrigibility. 88
Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh concluded that Miller
only required a sentencer to follow a particular process before imposing
a JLWOP sentence. 89 Miller did not require a factual finding of incorrigibility because such a finding was not necessary to achieve Miller’s
mandate that JLWOP be imposed only in rare circumstances.90 The
Court also noted language in Montgomery that appeared to reject the incorrigibility finding requirement. 91
Importantly, the Jones majority noted that their decision should not
“preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder.” 92 States may
categorically prohibit JLWOP or require extra factual finding before
imposing the sentence. 93 The Jones decision, the majority explained, only meant that “the U.S. Constitution does not demand those particular
policy approaches.”94
86. Id. at 311 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated by allowing the trial court to decide
whether to impose life without parole.”).
87. Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2013), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1293 (2020).
88. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321 (2021).
89. Id. at 1314.
90. Id. at 1318.
91. Id. at 1314–15. The Court cited the following language from Montgomery for support:
Louisiana suggests that Miller cannot have made a constitutional distinction between
children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption because Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact
regarding a child’s incorrigibility. That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the degree of procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive
guarantee. . . . That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not
leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life
without parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 1315 n.2 (quoting Montgomery, 577 U. S. at 211).
92. Id. at 1323.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The analysis in Jones bore striking resemblance to that in Skinner.
Indeed, Skinner may have provided some analytical guidance to the Jones
majority, as Justice Kavanaugh cited Skinner approvingly at the end of
his opinion. 95 However, Skinner and Jones further confused, rather than
clarified, the issue of exactly when a JLWOP sentence may be imposed.
Miller held that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
[LWOP] will be uncommon” because of “the great difficulty . . . of distinguishing . . . between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” 96 Later, in Montgomery,
the Court again counseled that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption.” 97 The language in these cases—language that
neither Skinner nor Jones categorized as dicta—suggests that there is a
threshold below which JLWOP is disproportionate in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The holding of Skinner and Jones—that no threshold finding must be made before imposing JLWOP—seems contradictory to a plain reading of Miller and Montgomery. Moreover, if Miller
merely announced a particular sentencing procedure, as Justice Kavanaugh suggested, why would the Montgomery Court hold that Miller
effected substantive changes in the law that gave the decision retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane? 98
As will be discussed in Part II, these inconsistencies create practical
challenges in sentencing, which provide yet another reason for abolishing JLWOP.
II. PROBLEMS WITH CARP AND SKINNER
The two most important Michigan JLWOP decisions, Carp and
Skinner, do not withstand scrutiny. This Part illuminates these cases’
flaws and concludes that JLWOP is both conceptually and practically
untenable, and thus should be abolished in Michigan. Section II.A
shows that the Carp majority applied a test that the Graham Court explicitly rejected as inappropriate for the type of claim presented. It further
explains that a faithful application of the Graham approach suggests that
the continued practice of JLWOP rests on shaky constitutional grounds
today. Section II.B demonstrates that the approach advocated by the
Skinner and Jones courts is not viable because it creates an intolerable risk

95.
96.
(2010)).
97.
98.

Id. at 1319.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 195 (2015).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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of arbitrary sentencing. These conceptual and practical challenges make
a categorical ban on JLWOP in Michigan the only appropriate course of
action.
A. The Carp Majority Should Have Developed and
Applied a Categorical Approach
The Carp decision is problematic because the majority applied a test
that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously rejected in categorical
Eighth Amendment challenges. 99 Recall that in Graham, the Court specifically noted that “the present case involves an issue the Court has not
considered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.” 100 The majority then opined that Graham “implicates a particular
type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes. As a result, a threshold comparison between the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime does not
advance the analysis.” 101 Based on these observations, the Graham majority proceeded to apply the categorical two-step approach advanced in
cases such as Roper. 102
The sentence at issue in Carp differed from that in Graham in only
one respect: the Carp sentence applied to an entire class of offenders
convicted of the same crime, rather than offenders who committed a
range of crimes. 103 This slight difference, however, does not justify applying the proportionality test in a categorical challenge based on the
characteristics of the offender class. This is because the categorical approach is the only test that is capable of considering the youthful characteristics of a juvenile offender, as the Miller trilogy requires. The proportionality test, which weighs the offense (not the offender) against
the punishment, leaves no room for any consideration of an offender’s
characteristics. In contrast, the two-step categorical approach adopted
by the Graham Court “requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders . . . in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the
severity of the punishment in question.” 104 In fact, the Washington Supreme Court adopted this very reasoning when it rejected the propor-

99. People v. Carp, 825 N.W.2d 801, 842 (Mich. 2014). In Carp, the Michigan Supreme Court
applied the three-step approach rejected by the Graham Court. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61–
62 (2010).
100. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 62.
103. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(6)(1953) (listing six types of offense as disqualifying for parole
eligibility, including first-degree murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct).
104. Id. at 67 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
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tionality test in a similar categorical challenge. 105 Likewise, the Iowa
Supreme Court held in State v. Sweet that, “[i]n considering whether to
adopt a categorical approach to the class of offenders or offenses under
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution, we
have referred to the two-step process found in the cases of the United
States Supreme Court.” 106
The Carp majority may have felt bound by precedent to apply the
proportionality test because, unlike Washington and Iowa, Michigan
caselaw did not (and still does not) have an analogue to the Supreme
Court’s two-step categorical approach. 107 However, that does not mean
that Michigan courts are required to apply the proportionality test
when reviewing sentencing challenges.
Because the proportionality test fails to incorporate the fundamental lessons of the Miller trilogy, the Michigan Supreme Court must reconsider the wisdom of its prior decisions. This is especially imperative
as the Michigan cases that embraced the proportionality test were decided long before the Miller trilogy. 108 Ensuring that children are treated
like children under the law is far more important than mechanical deference to precedent. Accordingly, in Carp, the Michigan Supreme Court
should have adopted the two-step categorical approach and clarified its
necessity.
If the court were to perform that analysis today, it would likely
reach the conclusion that JLWOP should be categorically prohibited.
Under the categorical approach, the court must first examine “objective
indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments
and state practice” to determine whether there is a national consensus
against JLWOP. 109 When it decided Carp, the court observed that only
six states had categorically prohibited JLWOP.110 Now, more than nine
years after Miller, that is no longer the case. Twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia have categorically prohibited JLWOP. 111 Further,
105. State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 350–51 (Wash. 2018).
106. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 835 (Iowa 2016).
107. Michigan’s proportionality test was set forth in People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831–33
(Mich. 1972), and reaffirmed in People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 873 (Mich. 1992). Lorentzen examined the constitutionality of a statute mandating a minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment for
the sale of narcotics. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d at 829. Bullock involved a challenge to Michigan’s mandatory LWOP sentence for possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 867.
Neither case involved a categorical challenge based on the characteristics of the offender. As such,
the court did not have the occasion to devise a test that considered the characteristics of the offender.
108. The earliest case in the Miller trilogy, Roper v. Simmons, was decided in 2005—thirteen
years after Bullock and thirty-three years after Lorentzen.
109. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
110. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 843–44 (Mich. 2014).
111. See infra note 180; see also Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G
PROJECT (May 24, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-withoutparole/ [https://perma.cc/S8PA-UAKV].
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the comparison should not end at whether other jurisdictions have officially put an end to the practice. In Graham, the Court remarked that
“[t]here are measures of consensus other than legislation” 112 and that
“[a]ctual sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into consensus.” 113 At the time of writing, nine states that permit
JLWOP have no prisoners serving the sentence. 114 These numbers indicate that Michigan is one of only sixteen states that both permit JLWOP
and have juveniles serving this sentence. At a minimum, these findings
demonstrate that Michigan is in the minority in terms of reducing the
size of its JLWOP population. This trend weakens the Carp majority’s
observation that JLWOP was not so unusual that it failed the first step
of the categorical test. On the contrary, the consistent trend in JLWOP
policymaking and sentencing practice indicates a growing consensus
against the sentence. Given these findings, Michigan is clearly on the
wrong side of history.
The second step of the test requires the court to exercise its independent judgment in determining whether JLWOP is constitutional. 115
Three factors guide this evaluation: 1) “the culpability of the offenders at
issue in light of their crimes and characteristics”; 2) “the severity of the
punishment in question”; and 3) “whether the challenged sentencing
practice serves legitimate penological goals.” 116
In terms of culpability, the Miller trilogy has affirmatively established that children are less culpable than adults committing the same
crime because of their “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences.” 117 This is true regardless of whether the
crime committed is homicide—the offense involved in Carp. The argument that children are somehow more culpable for murder than a lesser
offense does not hold up, since the youthful characteristics that the Miller trilogy identified do not simply disappear when children commit
murder. Indeed, Miller itself dealt with the mandatory imposition of
JLWOP on homicide offenders, and the Court still recognized that children were less culpable than adults in that context. 118
The next factor is the severity of the sentence. LWOP is the most severe punishment available in Michigan because of the state’s constitutional ban on capital punishment. 119 The Graham majority recognized

112. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433
(2008)).
113. Id.
114. These states are: Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. See Rovner, supra note 111.
115. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
116. Id. at 67.
117. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
118. Id. at 479.
119. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 46 (“No law shall be enacted providing for the penalty of death.”).
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that LWOP “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable”
and “deprives [offenders] of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration.” 120 This is especially true when LWOP is imposed
on children, who will necessarily spend more time in prison than adults
who commit the same crimes.
Finally, the court must consider whether the sentence advances any
legitimate penological goal. 121 Retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation are all poorly served by JLWOP, and incapacitation alone does not
justify the imposition of the sentence. Retribution is served only when a
sentence is proportionate to the offender’s blameworthiness. 122 As explained, JLWOP is particularly harsh, even when it is imposed on juvenile homicide offenders, because children have diminished culpability.
As such, JLWOP does not advance the goal of retribution. JLWOP also
does not advance of the goal of deterrence because the youthful characteristics that make juvenile offenders less culpable also make them less
likely to consider the long-term consequences of their actions. As for
rehabilitation, even the Carp majority conceded that a JLWOP sentence
was antithetical to the rehabilitative ideal. 123 The fact that offenders are
sentenced to LWOP in the first place suggests that the State believes
them incapable of reform.
Thus, the only penological goal that JLWOP might serve is incapacitation. A JLWOP sentence, by definition, incapacitates the offender for
life. However, as Graham instructed, to justify JLWOP on incapacitation
grounds alone “requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.” 124 That judgment is questionable considering the
characteristics of juveniles—characteristics that do not change based
on the crime committed. Therefore, just as incapacitation did not justify JLWOP for non-homicide offenders in Graham, incapacitation does
not justify JLWOP for homicide offenders either. Indeed, adopting the
Graham Court’s reasoning, the Miller Court rejected incapacitation as
insufficient justification for a mandatory JLWOP sentence, even on
homicide juvenile offenders. 125
Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court has a great textual hook to
justify reaching beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s JLWOP jurisprudence. That textual hook is Michigan’s Constitution, which protects

120. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70.
121. Id. at 67.
122. See id. at 71 (“[T]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of
youth and immaturity.”).
123. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 845 (Mich. 2014).
124. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72.
125. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012).
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against “cruel or unusual” 126 punishment. This is distinct from the federal Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual” punishment. 127 Even the Carp majority recognized that, by virtue of this deliberate phraseological choice, the state constitution was intended to
offer broader protection than its federal counterpart. 128
The court could use this language to argue that JLWOP is categorically prohibited by the state constitution, even though it is not prohibited by the federal Constitution. Indeed, that may have been what the
Washington Supreme Court did in State v. Bassett. 129 The Washington
State Constitution forbids “cruel punishment.” 130 In Bassett, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted this provision in light of its precedent and determined that, “in the context of juvenile sentencing, article
I, section 14 [the cruel punishment provision] provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment.” 131 This determination preceded the
court’s application of the two-step categorical test and its ultimate
holding: that the discretionary imposition of JLWOP violated the Washington State Constitution. 132
B. Discretionary Imposition of JLWOP Leads to Arbitrary Sentencing Decisions
As discussed in Part I of this Note, Skinner and Jones support a categorical ban on JLWOP. Following Jones, the Michigan Supreme Court
has three options when it comes to imposing a JLWOP sentence. It can
1) continue to require no additional fact-finding before imposing
JLWOP (The Status Quo); 2) overrule Skinner and require a sentencer to
make an additional finding before imposing JLWOP (The Intermediate
Step); or 3) prohibit JLWOP (The Reform). As explained below, the first
two options are not viable in practice because they create an intolerably
high risk of arbitrary sentencing. Thus, a categorical ban is the only
path forward.
1. Michigan May Continue to Require No Additional Finding Before
Imposing JLWOP (The Status Quo)
Since Skinner, Michigan has allowed a sentencer to impose JLWOP
without making any additional finding regarding incorrigibility, so
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 844 (Mich. 2014).
State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (2018).
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Bassett, 428 P.3d at 350.
Id. at 352–54.
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long as the sentencer complies with the requirements laid out in MCL §
769.25. As mentioned in Section I.D, MCL § 769.25 requires a sentencing court to specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it considered and the reasons it imposed the sentence it
chose. 133 A manual published by the Michigan Judicial Institute in May
2021 confirms that this remains the procedure post-Jones. 134 Unfortunately, this approach gives a sentencer no guidance for considering the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In contrast, under a standard such as incorrigibility, a sentencer must at least explain how their
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances leads to
a finding of incorrigibility. In other words, an incorrigibility requirement creates a threshold that the sentencer must meet.
Without this threshold, however, a sentencer’s consideration of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be unguided, cursory, or
even nominal. What is to stop a sentencer from simply declaring in every case that they have considered all relevant circumstances and find
JLWOP appropriate? There is no effective mechanism to cabin a sentencer’s discretion since the sentencer does not need to make any specific findings. Given how deferential appellate courts are to lower court
findings, no level of scrutiny is likely to disturb a sentencer’s decision,
absent evidence of obvious abuse of discretion. This creates a serious
risk of arbitrary sentencing—a risk that the people of Michigan should
not bear.
A recent Michigan Supreme Court case illustrates this risk. In People
v. Masalmani, the court considered Ihab Masalmani’s JLWOP sentence. 135 One of the questions at issue was whether the sentencing
court, applying Miller, properly examined the characteristics associated
with Masalmani’s age. 136 In an unreasoned order, the majority of the
Michigan Supreme Court denied Masalmani’s application for leave to
appeal. 137
In dissent, Chief Justice McCormack criticized the trial court for
failing to treat the Miller factors as mitigating considerations. 138 For example, in assessing Masalmani’s potential for rehabilitation, the trial
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(7) (2022).
134. Procedures for Handling Juvenile Life-Without-Parole (“LWOP”) Sentencings and Resentencings
Under Miller v Alabama, Jones v Mississippi, People v Skinner, and MCL 769.25/MCL 769.25a,
MICH. JUD. INST., https://mjieducation.mi.gov/documents/family-qrms/285-juv-lwop-tables/file
[https://perma.cc/6SWJ-FR94] (Oct. 1, 2021).
135. People v. Masalmani, 943 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. 2020) (mem.), cert. denied sub nom. Masalmani v. Michigan, 141 S. Ct. 2634 (2021).
136. People v. Masalmani, 924 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 2019) (mem.), vacated, People v. Masalmani,
943 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. 2020) (mem.), cert. denied sub nom. Masalmani v. Michigan, 141 S. Ct. 2634
(2021).
137. People v. Masalmani, 943 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. 2020) (mem.), cert. denied sub nom. Masalmani v. Michigan, 141 S. Ct. 2634 (2021).
138. Id. at 360 (McCormack, J., dissenting).
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court noted his troubled upbringing but concluded that it supported the
imposition of JLWOP. 139 The proffered reasoning was that Masalmani
had minimal capacity for reform because he was unlikely to get the type
of treatment he needed in prison. 140 This logic effectively swallows the
rehabilitation factor altogether. In every instance, the trial court may
simply declare that since the juvenile will be imprisoned, and since the
range of rehabilitative services offered in prisons is inevitably limited,
the juvenile will almost always fail to get some treatment and therefore
fall short of full rehabilitation. Moreover, under this logic, the State’s
inability to provide the requisite treatment necessary for incarcerated
juvenile offenders becomes an aggravating factor in sentencing. As Chief
Justice McCormack aptly put it, “[t]he trial court did not evaluate Masalmani’s potential for rehabilitation but rather the state’s inability to
facilitate such rehabilitation.” 141 This decision provides a clear example
of a sentencing court’s unguided application of the Miller factors. Because the Michigan Supreme Court refused to take up the case, the sentencing court’s arbitrary decision will stand.
Preventing arbitrary sentencing aligns with Michigan’s longstanding opposition to the death penalty. Michigan was the first state in the
Union to categorically prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. 142
This categorical ban was partly motivated by the sentencing and execution of two innocent men. 143 The tragedy helped generate momentum
for a categorical ban on the death penalty, and in 1847, the Michigan
legislature passed an Act outlawing this sentence. 144 That ban was later
enshrined in the Michigan Constitution. 145 In the JLWOP context, if a
sentencer may impose a JLWOP sentence without any threshold finding, arbitrary sentencing decisions, like the one in Masalmani, will likely
ensue. Under such a regime, juvenile offenders who are entirely capable
of reform risk being condemned to prison for life. Because JLWOP is a
death-in-prison sentence, this result will not be much different, in
principle, from sentencing an innocent adult to death.

139. Id. at 363 (McCormack, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 363–64 (McCormack, J., dissenting).
142. See Dan Austin, The Day Michigan Became 1st State to Ban Death Penalty, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(May 4, 2015, 4:37 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2015/05/04/death-penalty/26879705/
[https://perma.cc/A8H6-XKMJ].
143. Id.
144. See Eugene G. Wagner, Michigan and Capital Punishment, 81 MICH. BAR J. 38, 40 (2002).
145. Id. at 41.
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2. Michigan May Require Some Fact-Finding Before Imposing JLWOP
(The Intermediate Step)
Under Jones, states could require a sentencer to find additional facts
before imposing JLWOP. This path would likely require the sentencer to
make an incorrigibility finding, since Miller holds that JLWOP is only
appropriate when a juvenile is irreparably corrupted. Adopting this approach would require the Michigan Supreme Court to overrule part of
Skinner. Even if it did so, this approach would be untenable in practice.
This is because the individualized inquiry required under Miller cannot
reliably distinguish a juvenile offender whose conduct reflects only
transient immaturity from one who is truly incorrigible. Overwhelming
evidence supports this conclusion.
First, a careful reading of Graham indicates that it is impossible to
make a case-by-case incorrigibility determination with sufficient accuracy. The Graham Court explicitly considered a case-by-case approach
when it evaluated the proportionality test in cases involving juvenile offenders. 146 The Court recognized that, theoretically, some juveniles
might have “sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time
demonstrate sufficient depravity to merit a life without parole sentence.” 147 However, the Court rejected this approach, cautioning that “it
does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.” 148
Importantly, this problem cannot be mitigated even with expert insight
because “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 149
Further, the Court noted the “unacceptable likelihood that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower
mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course.” 150 Finally,
the majority pointed out that, because juveniles tend to “mistrust adults
and have limited understanding of the criminal justice system and the
roles of the institutional actors within it,” a juvenile offender might
have a hard time working with defense counsel. 151 As such, only a categorical approach can avoid the risk that a sentencer would “erroneously

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–80 (2010).
Id. at 78 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 74 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 ).
Id. at 78 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ).
Id.
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conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life
without parole” because of the possibility of subpar representation. 152
Although Graham focused on JLWOP for non-homicide juvenile offenders, all the risk factors that the majority identified are also present
in the homicide context. The degree to which sentencing authorities
can accurately distinguish an irreparably corrupt offender from a temporarily immature one does not vary with the offense committed. As
such, it is at least equally hard to determine who exactly deserves
JLWOP in the homicide context. If anything, at least one of these factors will be even more salient and therefore more problematic in sentencing a homicide juvenile offender: a sentencer is more likely to be influenced by emotions and preconceptions when considering the
appropriate sentence for a homicide offender. Consequently, a subjective assessment of the heinousness of the crime is more likely to result
and overpower the mitigating factors associated with youth.
Moreover, the Graham Court’s hesitation to adopt a case-by-case
approach is well-supported by scientific literature. 153 Research shows
that it is difficult to predict the future threat of adult offenders, let alone
juvenile ones. 154 A 2013 American Bar Association report examining
Texas’ capital punishment procedure recommended that the state
abandon its “future dangerousness” determination altogether because
of the imprecise nature of such inquiries. 155 A more recent study also revealed that a common test for measuring future dangerousness, the
psychopathy checklist, can engender significant inaccuracy and should
not be used to draw conclusions about an individual’s future behavior. 156 Research is even more conclusive as to the unreliability of predicting future dangerousness in defendants under age twenty-one.
Cognitive science shows that the behavior of juveniles—even those who
have committed serious crimes—does not predict how they might be-

152. Id. at 78–79.
153. See, e.g., Casey Matsumoto, “Permanently Incorrigible” Is a Patently Ineffective Standard: Reforming the Administration of Juvenile Life Without Parole, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (2020); Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633 (2019); Reichman
Hoesterey, supra note 41.
154. See generally Marshall, supra note 153, at 1635 (“By limiting life without parole sentences to
only those juveniles who are irreparably corrupt, the Court is asking sentencers to predict whether
a juvenile will be a danger decades down the road and after a long prison sentence.”).
155. AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE
TEXAS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ASSESSMENT REPORT, viii (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/tx_complete_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
156. See David DeMatteo, Stephen D. Hart, Kirk Heilbrun, Marcus T. Boccaccini, Mark D.
Cunningham, Kevin S. Douglas, Joel A. Dvoskin, John F. Edens, Laura S. Guy, Daniel C. Murrie,
Randy K. Otto, Ira K. Packer & Thomas J. Reidy, Statement of Concerned Experts on the Use of the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist—Revised in Capital Sentencing to Assess Risk for Institutional Violence, 26 PSYCH.,
PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2020); see also Tess M.S. Neal, Christopher Slobogin, Michael J. Saks, David L.
Faigman & Kurt F. Geisinger, Psychological Assessments in Legal Contexts: Are Courts Keeping “Junk Science” out of the Courtroom?, 20 ASS’N PSYCH. SCI. J. 135 (2019).
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have once their brain becomes more mature. 157 Of course, some juvenile
offenders may commit violent criminal acts in the future, but it is practically impossible to determine which juveniles will fall in that category.
In sum, of the three paths that the Michigan Supreme Court can
take, the first two make it difficult, if not impossible, for sentencing authorities to impose a fair and accurate sentence. If no threshold finding
is required, as Jones and Skinner held, sentencing decisions risk being
entirely arbitrary. If incorrigibility remains the standard, a sentencer
has no reliable means of distinguishing between the transiently immature and the permanently incorrigible. Both approaches produce an intolerably high risk of sentencing undeserving juveniles to die in prison.
The recourse afforded to the wrongly sentenced—appellate review of
sentencing decisions—is unlikely to disturb the outcomes, barring obvious abuse of discretion.
Thus, the only way to avoid the risk of arbitrary sentencing is to
completely abolish JLWOP by stripping sentencers of the discretion to
impose it. That is what is required to make the juvenile justice system
fairer, and that is how the Michigan Supreme Court should respond to a
decision as confounding as Jones.
III. ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF REFORM
Part III of this Note argues that the Michigan Supreme Court
should prohibit JLWOP altogether. However, many justices—even
those in favor of more restrictions on JLWOP—might view a categorical
ban as too drastic, especially given the U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that JLWOP may be imposed in some cases. 158 This Part explores alternative ways to either abolish the sentence or limit its imposition. Section III.A discusses two judicial remedies that fall short of a
categorical ban but that might further restrict the use of JLWOP, and
Section III.B urges the Michigan Legislature to prohibit the sentence by
statute.

157. See Adriana Galván, Terrie Moffitt & Russell Poldrack, New Brain Science Shows Future Dangerousness Cannot Be Predicted in Defendants Under 21, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (July 1, 2020), https:/
/www.acslaw.org/expertforum/new-brain-science-shows-future-dangerousness-cannot-bepredicted-in-defendants-under-21/ [https://perma.cc/BAZ8-ET6K]; see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Ex Parte Wardlow, Nos. WR-58,548-01 and WR-58,548-02, 2020 WL 2059742 (Tex.
Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Wardlow v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 191 (2020).
158. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012) (“Our decision does not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham.”).
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A. Alternative Judicial Actions
While a categorical ban on JLWOP is unlikely, courts may restrict
its use in other ways. This Note discusses two judicial remedies that are
particularly promising in Michigan, given the composition of the state’s
high court. The first is creating a presumption against JLWOP that
would require juvenile offenders to receive a term-of-years sentence
unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender
is incorrigible. The second is extending Miller and Montgomery to offenders who commit crimes between eighteen and their mid-twenties,
which would increase the number of individuals entitled to the Miller
protection.
1. A Presumption Against JLWOP
A presumption against JLWOP requires a sentencing court to impose a term-of-years sentence unless the State can prove a juvenile defendant’s incorrigibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a presumption imposes a higher evidentiary burden on prosecutors and requires a
jury to make a finding of incorrigibility before a sentencing court may
impose a JLWOP sentence. Although the incorrigibility standard is imperfect, as previously discussed, this reform at least ensures that
JLWOP will not be imposed unless prosecutors overcome the presumption. Thus, such a presumption will likely reduce the imposition of
JLWOP.
To adopt this approach, the Michigan Supreme Court would need
to overrule Skinner in part. Recall that the statute at issue in Skinner,
MCL §769.25, imposes additional procedural requirements on both
prosecutors and sentencing courts before JLWOP may be imposed.159
Specifically, before sentencing an offender to JLWOP, the sentencing
judge must specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances considered and the reasons supporting the ultimate sentence imposed. 160 The key question in Skinner was whether this requirement constituted additional fact-finding beyond that inherent in a
jury verdict. 161 If it did constitute additional fact-finding (a “murderplus” reading), the statute might violate the Sixth Amendment by delegating the jury’s fact-finding responsibility to the judge. 162 If it did not
constitute additional fact-finding (a “murder-minus” reading), the
statute might violate the Eighth Amendment if the Court interpreted

159.
160.
161.
162.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2022).
Id. § 769.25(7).
People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 303 (Mich. 2018).
Id. at 320–21.
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Miller and Montgomery as mandating additional fact-finding before
JLWOP may be imposed. 163
The majority found no constitutional violation whatsoever. 164 It held
that the statute did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment because
neither Miller nor Montgomery required a sentencer to find any particular fact before imposing JLWOP. 165 Further, the requirement embedded
in MCL §769.25 was not an additional fact-finding process that must be
performed by a jury. 166 Accordingly, the Court determined that the statute fully complied with the Sixth Amendment. 167
Then-Justice McCormack, joined by Justice Bernstein, wrote a
compelling dissent. Justice McCormack concluded that neither “murder-plus” nor “murder-minus” could cure the statute’s constitutional
infirmity. 168 On the one hand, reading the statute as “murder-plus”—as
requiring additional fact-finding before imposing JLWOP—would violate the Sixth Amendment 169 because the statute clearly directs a sentencing judge to reach beyond facts found by a jury before imposing
JLWOP. 170 The majority sidestepped this issue by holding that the statute did not require any additional fact-finding. To Justice McCormack,
that conclusion defied a plain reading of the statutory text. 171
On the other hand, reading the statute as “murder-minus”—as requiring no additional fact-finding before imposing JLWOP—would
create an Eighth Amendment problem. This is because the statute does
not allow for a presumption against JLWOP, which Justice McCormack
believed Miller and Montgomery mandated. 172 Miller and Montgomery undoubtedly “require[] something beyond merely a finding that all the elements of an offense are proved to sentence a juvenile to LWOP.”173 Miller’s holding supports the reading that certain factors must be
considered before sentencing authorities can impose JLWOP. 174 A sentencer’s consideration of the Miller factors necessarily constitutes factfinding beyond that inherent in the jury verdict. Accordingly, unless
and until a sentencer engages in such additional fact-finding, JLWOP

163. Id. at 323–24.
164. Id. at 295.
165. Id. at 310 ([T]he Eighth Amendment does not require the finding of any particular fact
before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.”).
166. Id. at 306 (holding that JLWOP is authorized by the jury verdict alone).
167. Id. at 311.
168. Id. at 318–24 (McCormack, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 317.
170. Id. at 320–21.
171. Id. at 318 (“I see no way to conclude that the jury verdict alone authorizes an LWOP juvenile sentence under the statute’s plain language.”).
172. Id. at 323–34.
173. Id. at 322.
174. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012) (specifying five factors that sentencing
courts must consider in imposing JLWOP).
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may not be imposed. In Justice McCormack’s words, “a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the
creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life
in prison without the possibility of parole.” 175 According to Justice
McCormack, this is the only reasonable reading of Miller and Montgomery, which reserved a JLWOP sentence for the rare juvenile offenders
who are beyond reform. 176
Justices McCormack and Bernstein are not the only ones who interpret Miller and Montgomery to mandate a presumption against JLWOP.
Since Miller, at least seven state supreme courts have held that Miller
and Montgomery create a rebuttable presumption against JLWOP that
can be overcome only where the state proves permanent incorrigibility
beyond a reasonable doubt. 177 Given Miller’s emphasis on the necessary
rarity of JLWOP, requiring the state to prove irreparable corruption before imposing a JLWOP sentence is exceedingly reasonable.
Moreover, the absence of such a presumption creates perverse incentives and exacerbates the resource disparity between the state and
individual defendants. Without a default a term-of-years sentence with
the possibility of release, there is nothing to stop prosecutors from recommending JLWOP at resentencing hearings; all they have to do is sit
back and wait for individual defendants to demonstrate that they do not
deserve to die in prison. It is also hard to imagine how individual defendants, many of whom do not have adequate access to rehabilitative
services, can prove a negative—that they are not beyond reform. If the

175. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 323 (McCormack, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Batts,
163 A.3d 410, 452 (Pa. 2017)).
176. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80.
177. Reichman Hoesterey, supra note 41, at 198 app. E. These seven states are: Indiana, Conley
v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012) (“The penalty phase of an LWOP trial requires introduction
of evidence with the burden on the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Missouri,
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013) (“[A] juvenile offender cannot be sentenced to life
without parole for first-degree murder unless the state persuades the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that this sentence is just and appropriate under all the circumstances.”); Pennsylvania,
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 452 (Pa. 2017) (“We therefore conclude that in Pennsylvania,
a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the creation of a
presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole.”); Connecticut, State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1214 (Conn. 2015) (“[Miller’s] language suggests
that the mitigating factors of youth establish, in effect, a presumption against imposing a life sentence without parole on a juvenile offender that must be overcome by evidence of unusual circumstances.”); Iowa, State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa 2015) (“Thus, the presumption for any
sentencing judge is that the judge should sentence juveniles to life in prison with the possibility of
parole for murder unless the other factors require a different sentence.”); Utah, State v. Houston,
353 P.3d 55 (Utah 2015); and Wyoming, Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666, 681 (Wyo. 2018) (“A faithful application of Miller and Montgomery requires Wyoming to join Pennsylvania and the other states that
have concluded there must be a presumption against imposing a life sentence without parole, or
its functional equivalent, on a juvenile offender. Further, we conclude, as did Pennsylvania and
Missouri, that the State bears the burden of overcoming that presumption at sentencing.” (citations omitted)).
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burden of persuasion and proof falls on the state, however, prosecutors
must unearth evidence of permanent incorrigibility. The latter is more
in line with Miller’s mandate: that JLWOP sentences must be rarely and
thoughtfully imposed.
In text and spirit, Miller and Montgomery create a presumption
against JLWOP—a presumption that can be overcome only if the state
can prove that an offender is permanently incorrigible beyond a reasonable doubt. At least three sitting justices on the Michigan Supreme
Court have indicated that Skinner was wrongly decided and would adopt
a presumption against JLWOP. Chief Justice McCormack and Justice
Bernstein advocated for this reading in their Skinner dissent. 178 Most recently, in Masalmani, both justices reiterated their dissent from the
Skinner majority and stated that they would overrule Skinner in its entirety. 179 This time, they found an ally in Justice Megan Cavanagh, who
was not a member of the Skinner court but signed onto the Masalmani
dissent. 180 Of the Justices in the Skinner majority, only Justices Zahra
and Viviano are still on the bench. 181 The two remaining members of the
court, Justice Clement and Justice Welch, have yet to share their views
on this issue. But it is safe to say that, when the appropriate case reaches the current court, proponents of the presumption will need to convince only one additional justice to overrule Skinner and adopt a presumption against JLWOP. As such, a strategy focused on convincing the
court to adopt a presumption against JLWOP may be more promising
than advocating for an outright ban on the sentence.

178. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d at 323–24 (McCormack, J., dissenting).
179. People v. Masalmani, No. 325662, 2016 WL 5329765 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal
granted, 924 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 2019), vacated, 943 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. 2020) (McCormack, J., dissenting).
180. Justices Bernstein and Cavanagh joined the dissenting statement of Chief Justice
McCormack in Masalmani. Masalmani, 943 N.W.2d at 364 (McCormack, J., dissenting). Justice
Cavanagh was elected to the Michigan Supreme Court in 2018 and began her tenure on January 1,
2019. When Skinner was decided in June 2018, she was not yet a member of the court. Megan
Cavanagh, MICH. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.micourthistory.org/justices/megan-cavanagh/
[https://perma.cc/TF9F-77F5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
181. Justice Stephen Markman, the Skinner majority author, retired on January 1, 2021. See Associated Press, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Retiring After 21 Years Calls Service a Blessing, DETROIT
NEWS (Nov. 14, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/11/14
/michigan-supreme-court-justice-retiring-markman/114942590/ [https://perma.cc/5ZGR-NMQN].
He was succeeded by Justice Elizabeth Welch. See Oralandar Brand-Williams, Meet Michigan’s Incoming Supreme Court Justice: Elizabeth Welch, DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020, 10:45 PM), https://
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/11/24/elizabeth-welch-michigan-newestsupreme-court-justice/6317246002/?gnt-cfr=1 [https://perma.cc/FR3L-CDHN].
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2. An Extension of Miller and Montgomery
Another alternative is to extend Miller and Montgomery to individuals between ages eighteen and twenty-five, a period during which the
decision-making part of the brain continues to mature and alter human
behavior. 182 Across the nation, a few courts have entertained this proposal, but most of them, including the Michigan Supreme Court, have
rejected calls for such an extension. 183 Nevertheless, since the Michigan
Supreme Court last considered this question, the composition of the
bench has changed. For this reason, this reform remains promising in
Michigan, given that several sitting justices have indicated an interest
in exploring it.
The chief argument in favor of extending Miller and Montgomery to
offenders who commit their crimes between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five is that the youthful characteristics identified in the Miller
trilogy continue to develop well into the mid-twenties. 184 This contention is logical. After all, the immaturity and impetuosity that the law
recognizes as mitigating factors for seventeen-year-olds do not magically disappear at age eighteen. Indeed, research suggests that the prefrontal cortex, the part of human brain responsible for executive functions, does not fully mature until the early to mid-twenties. 185 Poor
executive function can lead to “difficulty with planning, attention, using feedback, and mental inflexibility, all of which could undermine
judgment and decision-making.” 186 The implication is that human beings are not fully capable of good judgment and rational decisionmaking until they are in their early to mid-twenties. Given this evidence, the eighteen-year-old line seems arbitrary and more connected
to our societal conception of age eighteen as a turning point from adolescence to adulthood than to developmental science. Indeed, that is

182. See, e.g., Emily Powell, Underdeveloped and Over-Sentenced: Why Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds
Should Be Exempt from Life Without Parole, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 83 (2018).
183. E.g., Haughey v. Comm’r of Corr., 164 A.3d 849, 856 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017); People v.
Pittman, 104 N.E.3d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); People v. Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 2020).
184. See Application for Leave to Appeal at 13–14, People v. Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905 (Mich.
2020) (No. 160034), cert. denied sub nom. Manning v. Michigan, 142 S. Ct. 405 (2021); Kathryn Monahan, Laurence Steinberg & Alex R. Piquero, Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice: A Developmental Perspective, 44 CRIME & JUST. 577 (2015); Kelsey B. Shust, Extending Sentencing Mitigation for Deserving
Young Adults, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2014).
185. See, e.g., Mariam Arain, Maliha Haque, Lina Johal, Puja Mathur, Wynand Nel, Afsha Rais,
Ranbir Sandhu & Sushil Sharma, Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE &
TREATMENT 449, 459 (2013).
186. Sarah B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The
Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216,
217 (2009).
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exactly how the Roper Court justified their line-drawing decision in the
capital punishment context. 187
Proponents of extending Miller heeded the science and argued that
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five are more like children than mature adults when it comes to rational decision-making. 188
Unfortunately, this argument met with resistance in court. For example, in Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Court of
Appeals rejected an attempt to extend Miller to “youthful” offenders,
holding that “an offender who has reached the age of eighteen is not
considered a juvenile for sentencing procedures and Eighth Amendment protections articulated in Miller.” 189 In 2018, in what may have
been a sign of hope for youthful offenders, a federal district court in
Connecticut granted habeas corpus relief to a defendant sentenced to
LWOP for a crime he committed at age eighteen, noting that the youthful characteristics identified in Miller applied to eighteen-year-olds. 190
The Second Circuit, however, vacated this decision two years later,
holding that a mandatory LWOP sentence for offenders who commit
their crimes at age eighteen does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 191
The same result transpired in Illinois, 192 California, 193 and Wyoming. 194
In 2017 and 2018, the Michigan Court of Appeals twice considered and
rejected this argument in People v. Jordan 195 and People v. StantonLipscomb. 196 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in both
cases. 197
The most encouraging success stories have come from the Washington Supreme Court. At first, in 2015, the court held that the youth of
an eighteen-year-old offender was a mitigating circumstance because
of “fundamental differences between adolescent and mature brains.” 198
Most recently, in March 2021, the court held that a mandatory LWOP
sentence for eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds was unconstitutional
under the state constitution and the Eighth Amendment. 199 In so hold187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“[T]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”).
188. See generally Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff—Extending Graham and Miller to Adults,
78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013). For an example of lawyers arguing that Miller should apply to eighteenyear-olds, see Application for Leave to Appeal , supra note 184, at 14.
189. Haughey v. Comm’r of Corr., 164 A.3d 849, 856 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
190. See Cruz v. United States, No. 11-cv-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018).
191. Cruz v. United States, 826 Fed. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2020).
192. People v. Pittman, 104 N.E.3d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
193. People v. Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Ct. App. 2012).
194. Nicodemus v. State, 392 P.3d 408 (Wyo. 2017).
195. People v. Jordan, No. 328474, 2017 WL 908294 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2017).
196. People v. Stanton-Lipscomb, No. 337433, 2018 WL 4576682 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2018).
197. People v. Jordan, 901 N.W.2d 109 (Mich. 2017); People v. Stanton-Lipscomb, 925 N.W.2d
853 (Mich. 2019).
198. State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 364 (Wash. 2015).
199. In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021).
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ing, the court made clear that “[m]odern social science, our precedent,
and a long history of arbitrary line drawing have all shown that no clear
line exists between childhood and adulthood.” 200 Those decisions recognize that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds still possess the salient
characteristics of youth which diminish their culpability, warranting
lesser sentences.
Recently, the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed this question
again in People v. Manning. 201 Robin Manning received a mandatory
LWOP sentence for a crime he committed when he was eighteen years
and three months old. 202 On appeal, counsel for Manning, as well as the
ACLU of Michigan as amicus curiae, argued that Manning should not
be treated any differently than a seventeen-year-old and therefore
should come within the ambit of Miller and Montgomery, citing prolific
evidence in neurological science concerning adolescent brain development. 203 The majority of the Michigan Supreme Court again denied
leave to appeal. 204 In a concurring statement, Justice Markman, joined
by Justice Zahra, asserted that Manning was not entitled to relief because his mandatory LWOP sentence was not precluded by Miller and
Montgomery. 205 The two Justices then proceeded to recite the Carp
Eighth Amendment inquiry approvingly, indicating that they still found
Carp’s proportionality analysis convincing.206 Justice Clement filed a
separate concurring statement in which she also agreed that Manning’s
claim failed on the merits (i.e., that he was not entitled to relief because
his sentence was not unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 207 Chief Justice McCormack, again joined by Justices Bernstein
and Cavanagh, filed a dissenting statement in which she expressed interest in extending Miller and Montgomery to offenders who committed
their crimes at or over the age of eighteen in light of “advances in studies of brain development” demonstrating that youthful attributes continue well beyond eighteen. 208
As noted above, the breakdown of the bench in Manning suggests
that at least three members of the court are amenable to extending Miller and Montgomery in recognition of “fundamental differences between
adolescent and mature brains.” 209 Justices Zahra and Clement will be

200. Id. at 277.
201. People v. Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 2020).
202. Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 184, at 13.
203. Id. at 14–15; Brief of Amici Curiae Juv. L. Ctr. and Am. C.L. Union of Mich. in Support of
Defendant-Appellant Robin Manning at 3–5, Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905.
204. Manning, 951 N.W.2d 905 (order denying application for leave to appeal).
205. Id. at 905 (Markman, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 907.
207. Id. at 910.
208. Id. (McCormack, J., dissenting).
209. State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 364 (Wash. 2015).
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tough votes to get, given their unwillingness to extend Miller to someone who was just three months past eighteen. Thus, the outcome of this
reform again turns on two justices: Justice Viviano and Justice Welch.
At the time of writing, the Michigan Supreme Court had just heard oral
arguments in People v. Poole, 210 which considered whether Miller and
Montgomery should be extended to murder defendants who were over
seventeen years old when they committed a crime. 211 Since three sitting
justices appear amenable to such an expansion, this may be a more realistic path of reform than a categorical ban on JLWOP in the short term.
B. A Legislative Fix
In January 2021, Washtenaw County prosecutor Eli Savit urged the
Michigan Legislature to ban JLWOP, noting that “nearly half of the
states in the country now categorically prohibit” the sentence. 212 Indeed,
outside the realm of judicial pronouncements, the most straightforward solution is a law to ban JLWOP. Most recently, Maryland abolished JLWOP by statute in April 2021, 213 joining twenty-four other states
and the District of Columbia to officially ban the practice of sentencing
children to die in prison. 214 As of writing, twenty states and the District
of Columbia have enacted legislation to effectuate a complete ban (both
prospective and retroactive) on JLWOP since Miller. 215

210. Oral Argument, People v. Poole, 960 N.W.2d 529 (mem.) (Mich. 2021), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=qhOy3m2BwSk&t=1537s [https://perma.cc/KMH9-EDS8].
211. People v. Poole, 960 N.W.2d 529, 530 (mem.) (Mich. 2021).
212. Eli Savit (@EliNSavit), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://twitter.com/EliNSavit
/status/1350553631699959812 [perma.cc/LJ9D-9RGK].
213. Maryland Bans Life Without Parole for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://eji.org/news/maryland-bans-life-without-parole-for-children/ [perma.cc/WSH6-BKAH].
214. Rovner, supra note 111, at 4.
215. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have a complete ban on JLWOP. These
states are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Rovner, supra note
111. This section of the Note focuses on the nineteen states that have enacted legislation to completely
ban JLWOP since Miller. These states are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Legislation Eliminating Life-WithoutParole Sentences for Juveniles, JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/legislationeliminating-lwop/ [https://perma.cc/N4GS-FENG] (listing seventeen states that have banned JLWOP
through legislation since Miller); Virginia Abolishes Life Without Parole for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://eji.org/news/virginia-abolishes-life-without-parole-for-children/ [https://
perma.cc/A7NF-N5W3]; Ohio Abolishes Life Without Parole for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Jan. 13,
2021), https://eji.org/news/ohio-abolishes-life-without-parole-for-children/[https://perma.cc/M548NQPT]; Maryland Bans Life Without Parole for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 12, 2021), https://
eji.org/news/maryland-bans-life-without-parole-for-children/ [perma.cc/WSH6-BKAH]. Note that
Colorado enacted a prospective ban on JLWOP in 2006, but a retroactive ban on the sentence did not
transpire until 2016. Colorado, JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/colorado/
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Michigan’s response pales in comparison. As discussed, in response
to Miller, the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL §769.25, which set
forth a resentencing procedure that has been used by prosecutors
across the state to re-impose JLWOP at resentencing hearings. 216 Thus,
while the purported goal of the law is to bring the state into compliance
with Miller and Montgomery, there is reason to question whether this
resentencing scheme will comply with Miller by making a JLWOP
sentence extremely uncommon.
California is a good case study of legislating against JLWOP. In the
three years preceding Miller, California had the second-highest number
of JLWOP sentences per year behind Florida. 217 It had the fourth largest
JLWOP population in the country behind Pennsylvania, Michigan, and
Florida. 218 Yet the state was quick to respond to Miller and Montgomery.
In 2012, California became one of the first states to enact legislation in
response to Miller, giving juvenile lifers an opportunity to petition their
sentencing judge to reconsider their sentence. 219 Following Montgomery,
in 2017, California adopted two of the country’s most progressive postMontgomery juvenile justice reforms. 220 One of these laws granted parole

[https://perma.cc/ZDC9-2A6V]. Alaska, Kansas, and Kentucky abolished JLWOP by statute before
Miller and are therefore not included on this list. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.125 (West 2021); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 17-22.5-104(IV), 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(1) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6618 (2021); KY. REV.STAT.
ANN. § 640.040(1) (West 2021). Washington and Iowa effectuated a complete ban on JLWOP through
court decisions and are therefore not included on this list. See State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash.
2018); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016). Some reports claim that Montana also bans JLWOP
by statute. See e.g., John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn & Amelia Courtney Hritz, Juvenile Life Without Parole in
Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 595 (2016); CAMPAIGN FOR
THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE
SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 12 (2018), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E3ZB-FD4K]. However, it appears that judges have discretion to restrict access to parole.
See e.g., Joseph Landau, New Majoritarian Constitutionalism, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1033, 1075 n.225 (2018); A
State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com
/article/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85 [https://perma.cc/2KA3-WX9W]. Therefore, this Note
does not consider Montana’s scheme as a complete ban on JLWOP.
216. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, The Supreme Court Ruled That Sentences Like Hers Are
Unconstitutional. Prosecutors Are Fighting to Keep Her Incarcerated, APPEAL (Dec. 9, 2019), https:/
/theappeal.org/juvenile-life-without-parole-michigan/ [perma.cc/ZE66-JWC9]; Brian Dickerson,
Justice Delayed, Again, for Michigan’s Juvenile Lifers, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 27, 2016, 11:31 PM), http:
//www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/briandickerson/2016/08/27/michigan-juvenile-liferssentences/89363426/ [perma.cc/7822-LWKG].
217. DEBORAH LABELLE & ANLYN ADDIS, SECOND CHANCES 4 YOUTH, BASIC DECENCY: PROTECTING
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 25 (2012), http://jjie.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Basic
DecencyReport2012.pdf [perma.cc/AU5L-ANE6].
218. Id.
219. New Law Gives California Children Sentenced to Die in Prison a Chance for Parole, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE (Oct. 4, 2012), https://eji.org/news/california-law-gives-children-sentenced-to-die-inprison-chance-for-parole/ [https://perma.cc/9YMB-QY3A].
220. California Abolishes Death in Prison Sentences for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 13,
2017), https://eji.org/news/california-abolishes-juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/SFH2AXNN]; California, JUVENILE SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/california/ [https://
perma.cc/CP9Z-C2X5].
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eligibility to juvenile lifers during their twenty-fifth year of incarceration, putting an end to the discretionary imposition of JLWOP. 221 The
other law extended parole eligibility to those who commit their “controlling offenses” at or under the age of twenty-five. 222 A “controlling offense” is defined in the bill as “the offense or enhancement for which
any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” 223
Together, these two provisions ended not only JLWOP, but also LWOP
sentences imposed on those who committed their “controlling offenses”
at or under the age of twenty-five. These laws reflect not only the state’s
commitment to Miller and Montgomery, but also its recognition of developments in cognitive science.
Of course, passing legislation requires political will, and in this respect, each state is unique. However, there are good policy reasons for
any state legislature to abolish JLWOP. Two are particularly salient in
Michigan. First, LWOP takes a massive financial toll on the state.
JLWOP, which by definition entails longer imprisonment, only aggravates the problem. Second, JLWOP exacerbates racial disparities in an
already inequitable criminal justice system. In the quest towards a
more equitable society, eliminating JLWOP is a significant step in the
right direction.
1. JLWOP Exacts a Heavy Financial Burden on Michigan Taxpayers
Prisons must provide necessary services to accommodate all aspects
of an incarcerated individual’s life. As such, putting people behind bars
is an expensive endeavor. In Michigan, according to a January 2018
House Fiscal Agency report, the average cost of incarcerating one individual in prison was $36,106 in fiscal year 2017. 224 The same report
showed an allocation of approximately $1.95 billion to the Michigan Department of Corrections, which constituted nineteen percent of the
State’s $10.2 billion general fund budget. 225 In contrast, the educational
budget made up thirteen percent of the general fund revenue, and
budget for school aid only two percent. 226
Now consider the cost of housing incarcerated individuals for life.
According to a report published by the Washington State Office of Financial Management, “each LWOP sentence will cost Washington state
221. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(b) (West 2020).
222. Id.
223. Id. at § 3051(a)(2)(B).
224. ROBIN R. RISKO, HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, BUDGET BRIEFING: CORRECTIONS 26 (2018), https://
www.house.mi.gov/hfa/PDF/Briefings/Corrections_BudgetBriefing_fy17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc
/D3Z5-ZJGU].
225. Id. at 9.
226. Id.
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$51,193 each year for 30 years (until age 55). Elderly prisoners over 55 are
at least twice as costly to incarcerate as their younger peers.” 227 The January 2018 Michigan House Fiscal Agency report confirms that the same
trend was true in Michigan during the documented period. 228 This
should hardly come as a surprise, since elderly individuals who are incarcerated need more regular and likely more specialized medical services.
The problem is only exacerbated in the context of JLWOP, since juvenile lifers will stay in prison longer than adults sentenced to LWOP. A
recently updated report from the Sentencing Project put the cost of incarcerating a sixteen-year-old for fifty years (not even for life) at an astronomical $2.25 million. 229 In Michigan, a 2012 study posited that the
state spent $10 million per year incarcerating individuals for life for
crimes committed when they were juveniles. 230 Although up-to-date
statistics for Michigan are hard to pin down, it is safe to assume that
the cost would be close to these estimates.
Moreover, JLWOP poses additional financial burdens on states on
top of the costs associated with incarceration. Michigan’s current resentencing regime uses a resource-intensive process to determine
whether JLWOP is warranted. This process entails costs to the judicial
system, the defense, and the prosecution. Regardless of whether a finding of incorrigibility is required or where the burden of proof falls, the
Miller hearing under MCL § 769.25 requires the presentation of extensive evidence about a defendant’s past, including the defendant’s criminal record, medical history, family and social background, and anything else that might shed light on whether the defendant is capable of
reform. 231 The production of such evidence is a labor- and capitalintensive process. One estimate put the defense expenses for hearings
at $50,000 to $75,000 in Louisiana.232
These findings establish that JLWOP takes a big financial toll on
states generally, and especially on states like Michigan that house a significant number of juvenile lifers. Although budget is not the only factor
in determining legislative agenda, it is certainly prudent for lawmakers
to consider where taxpayer money goes and should go. When school aid
227. Incarceration of Elderly Inmates: Research and Data Points, WASH. OFF. FIN. MGMT., at 2,
https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/legacy/sgc/meetings/2016/01/incarceration_elderly_
inmates.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YB9-8BFC].
228. See RISKO, supra note 224, at 32 (“One major factor in the rise of per-prisoner health care
costs is the aging of the prison population.”).
229. Rovner, supra note 111, at 4.
230. LABELLE & ADDIS, supra note 217, at 30.
231. Ben Finholt, Brandon L. Garrett, Karima Modjadidi & Kristen M. Renberg, Juvenile Life
Without Parole in North Carolina, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 167 (2020).
232. Bryn Stole, With New Law on the Books, Louisiana Courts Prepare to Re-Sentence Hundreds of
Juvenile Murderers, ADVOCATE (July 23, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge
/news/courts/article_dc5ae4c2-6f28-11e7-9633-2bee1fbaf113.html [https://perma.cc/DE53-ZVY4].
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appropriation represents only one-tenth of the correctional budget, the
legislature may face a reckoning over its priorities.233
2. JLWOP Widens Racial Disparities in Michigan’s
Juvenile Justice System
In 2016, the American University Law Review published an article
that used data from state corrections departments to demonstrate that
people of color are overrepresented in the national JLWOP population
“in ways perhaps unseen in any other aspect of our criminal justice system.” 234 Using this dataset, the Prison Policy Initiative calculated that
people of color constituted only thirty-eight percent of the U.S. population in 2015, but seventy-seven percent of those serving a JLWOP sentence across the country were people of color. 235 Moreover, the rate at
which Black children were sentenced to JLWOP compared to their white
peers only increased over time, demonstrating a widening gap in the
racial composition of juvenile lifers nationwide. 236
The situation is no different in Michigan. A 2012 Michigan-specific
study confirms that people of color are overrepresented among JLWOP
prisoners in the state. The study found that seventy-three percent of
youth serving a JLWOP sentence are children of color, even though
children of color only represent twenty-nine percent of the state’s youth
population. 237 In Wayne County, where Detroit is located, more than
ninety percent of those serving a JLWOP sentence are Black, even
though Black people constitute just forty percent of the county population. 238
The disproportionate imposition of JLWOP on racial minorities is
largely due to disturbing racial dynamics at the charging and pleabargaining stage. According to the 2012 Michigan study, “[y]outh accused of a homicide offense where the victim was white were 22% less
likely to receive a plea offer than in cases where the victim was a person
of color.” 239 More fundamentally, imposing JLWOP on racial minorities
at such a disproportionate rate suggests a troubling assumption that
racial minorities are categorically less likely to learn from and grow out
233. See RISKO, supra note 224, at 9.
234. Mills et al., supra note 215, at 579.
235. Joshua Aiken, Prison Pol’y Initiative, Why Do We Lock Juveniles up for Life and Throw Away the
Key? Race Plays a Big Part, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org
/blog/2016/09/15/juvenile_lwop/ [https://perma.cc/87EE-HVFG].
236. Id.
237. LABELLE & ADDIS, supra note 217, at 15.
238. Kira Lerner, In Detroit Prosecutor Race, a Stark Contrast on Whether Children Should Serve Life in
Prison, THE APPEAL (July 22, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/wayne-county-detroitprosecutor-election-youth-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/DS7M-W6TD].
239. LABELLE & ADDIS, supra note 217, at 15.
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of their mistakes. The current resentencing scheme does nothing to
counteract this assumption. In fact, the existing resentencing regime
does nothing to stop prosecutors from disproportionately re-imposing
JLWOP on people of color, and thereby perpetrating racial disparities in
the juvenile justice system. Indeed, in 2016, following the Montgomery
decision, Wayne County prosecutor Kym Worthy announced that she
would “aggressively pursue life without possibility of parole” in 60 of the
county’s 141 JLWOP cases. 240 Though Worthy did not announce the details of the sixty individuals she was intent on keeping in prison for life,
data shows that “even if the list includes every white or Hispanic person
serving juvenile life without parole in Wayne County, black LWOP defendants would still account for 80 percent of those being retried for
LWOP.”241 As such, anything short of a categorical ban risks exacerbating racial inequity in Michigan’s juvenile justice system.
CONCLUSION
This Note urges the complete abolition of juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) in Michigan. Although Miller already limits JLWOP, further reform remains necessary for two reasons. First, although Miller
and Montgomery require that the sentence be extremely uncommon,
prosecutors still seek to impose the sentence in numbers that cannot be
reconciled with these two decisions. This problem is only exacerbated
by Skinner and Jones, as sentencers are not required to make specific
findings before imposing the harshest sentence in the state. A large
JLWOP population leads to a series of problems, including a massive
financial burden that the State must bear to house a non-negligible
number of juvenile lifers and the exacerbation of racial disparity in the
juvenile justice system. The only way to solve these problems is to strip
prosecutors of the power to impose a JLWOP sentence. This is not an
uncommon or drastic solution, as evidenced by the trend of reform
across the country following Miller and Montgomery. 242 Second, the law
has an expressive function. To abolish JLWOP is to recognize the unmistakable fact that, with appropriate resources, children are capable
of rehabilitation and reform. The United States is the only country in
the world that imposes a death-in-prison sentence on children. 243 A categorical ban on JLWOP in a state with one of the country’s largest juve240. Josie Duffy Rice, Detroit’s Head Prosecutor Doesn’t Believe These Black Kids Can Change, DAILY
KOS (July 29, 2016, 10:59 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2016/7/29/1554091/-Why-doesn-tDetroit-s-head-prosecutor-believe-these-kids-can-change [https://perma.cc/B4HC-HV6F].
241. Id.
242. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
243. JUVENILE L. CTR., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), https://jlc.org/issues/juvenile-lifewithout-parole [https://perma.cc/Z6HT-PQ6C].
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nile lifer populations 244 will go a long way in reaffirming America’s
commitment to human rights and international law. 245

244. Allie Gross, More than Half of Michigan Juvenile Lifers Still Wait for Resentencing, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Aug. 15, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.freep.com/in-depth/news/local/michigan/2019/08/15
/juvenile-lifers-michigan/1370127001/ [https://perma.cc/J74U-QFCQ] (“Michigan . . . has the second highest number of juvenile lifers in the nation.”).
245. JLWOP is condemned by international law. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art.
37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“States Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed
by persons below eighteen years of age.”).

